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Abstract
The question of the most effective order of reforming  authority prior to privatizing  incumbent
state-owned  enterprises has been hotly debated over the  telecommunications  firms.
years.  In the early 1990s many western advisers  Consistent with current thinking, Wallsten  finds that
encouraged  Eastern European countries and the former  countries that established separate regulatory authorities
Soviet Union to privatize  firms quickly  under the  prior to privatization  saw increased telecommunications
assumption that market institutions would develop once  investment,  fixed telephone  penetration, and cellular
firms were privately  owned. The thinking  since then has  penetration  compared with countries that did not.
emphasized the importance  of establishing an  Moreover, he finds that investors  are willing to pay  more
institutional  framework  conducive to promoting  for telecommunications  firms in countries that
competition  before privatizing firms. To date, there has  established  a regulatory  authority before privatization.
been little empirical work clarifying the debate.  This increased  willingness to pay is consistent with the
Wallsten attempts to address this gap by examining the  hypothesis that investors require  a risk premium to invest
effects of the sequence  of reform in telecommunications,  where regulatory  rules remain unclear.
particularly  the effects  of establishing  a regulatory
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Countries around the world have been furiously privatizing state-owned  firms over the
last two decades.  This wave of privatizations  has been massive: revenues  from privatizations
were estimated at close to $1  trillion through  1999 (Megginson and Netter 2001).  Privatization
typically has several  objectives, including increasing service provision, quality, and efficiency of
the firms; stemming the flow of public subsidies, which represent scarce public resources badly
needed  in other areas; and generating  revenues for state coffers.  Privatizing  state-owned firms
has proven to be complicated.  One important issue is how privatization  fits into a reform
process, and what the sequence of reforms should be.  In the early  1990s many influential
advisers recommended fast privatization  in Eastern  Europe and the former Soviet Union as the
only realistic method of reforming state-owned enterprises.  To the extent that there was much
debate on sequences of reforms it focused mainly on corporate governance and macroeconomic
conditions, but rarely on microeconomic  industrial structure or institutional  issues.  In particular,
those early debates almost completely ignored issues of competition and regulation.  By the end
of the 1  990s reformers recognized that ignoring the institutional and competitive  framework was
a mistake, and conventional  wisdom held that a regulatory framework should be in place prior to
privatization.
Absent from any of this debate, however,  has been much empirical evidence on how the
sequence  of reforms might matter.  This absence is understandable-consistent  data on reforms
are scarce, and time had to pass before  enough data was available to allow for empirical work.
In this paper I try to address this gap by testing the effects of reform sequencing in
telecommunications.  In particular,  I use panel data covering 200 countries from  1985-1999  to
test whether the sequence of regulatory  reforms and privatization matters.  Consistent with
current thinking, and contrary to early advice  on privatization,  establishing a regulatory authority
before privatizing the telecom firm is correlated with improved telecommunications  investment
and telephone penetration.  In addition,  in a sample of 33 countries where the data were
available, investors were willing to pay substantially more for firms in countries where
regulatory reform took place prior to privatization-consistent  with the hypothesis that
privatization in the absence of regulatory reform requires paying  investors a risk premium to
compensate for future regulatory uncertainty.
2Background
In the early 1990s Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union faced the daunting task of
moving their economies from almost complete state ownership  and command-and-control  to
market-based  systems.  Such radical reforms had not been attempted before, and there was much
debate  as to the proper way of proceeding.  The prevailing view at the time was for quick
privatization of large, state owned firms-that privatization  was "urgent and must take place
long before firms are restructured" (Blanchard,  et al.  1991).
Two general arguments  supported the argument for fast restructuring.  First, advisers
believed that "rapid privatization  is needed to combat the inevitable social, political, and
economic problems associated with the lack of corporate governance"  (Lipton and Sachs  1990).
The concern at the time was that the same factors and incentives that led the state to be
inefficient-and often corrupt-managers  of state-owned firms would prevent them from
properly restructuring firrns.  The way to bring about real and lasting reforms was to leave
restructuring  to private owners,  which meant removing the state from the economy as much as
possible as quickly as possible and quickly dealing with the question of property rights (Roland
1994).  Second,  governments were hard-pressed  for revenue,  and privatizing firms was  a realistic
way to raise funds.
Though quick privatization was the prevailing view, it was certainly not the only one.
Some suggested that perhaps privatization was moving forward  too rapidly.  Roland (1994)
believed that privatization  should be more gradual to deal with political problems and potential
backlash.  Others were concerned that perhaps not enough attention was being paid to the rule of
law and other institutional issues that were certain to be problems in countries with industries
dominated by large, state-owned firms (Summers  1994).  Finally, Newberry (1991) noted that
privatizing monopolies could be problematic,  and that perhaps emphasis should be placed on
breaking monopolies before privatization.  Still, to the extent that sequencing of reforms was a
concern,  it had more to do with macroeconomic  concerns rather than market structure or
institutions necessary for markets to function.  In general, there was a strong belief that
privatization was the key to reform, with little thought given to the institutional framework
necessary to allow markets to function.
3In particular,  the difficult task of building institutions charged with facilitating
competition was given short shrift.  Large monopoly firms were  often privatized with no
regulatory authorities present that could help facilitate  competition.  In some ways this decision
was understandable.  There was concem, for example, that regulatory agencies would simply
become the new mechanism through with the state could interfere with and direct the market.'
In addition, Western industrialized countries were beginning to realize the costs of regulation and
were rapidly deregulating  industries where there appeared to be little economic reason for
regulation (Winston  1993).  In that context it would have seemed somewhat hypocritical  to
advocate new regulatory authorities in transition and developing countries  while dismantling
them in industrialized  countries.
Despite these concerns, owners of monopoly firms, far from being interested in
promoting a market economy, naturally have a stronger preference for maintaining their
monopoly profits.  Newbery (1991) noted that reform advisers believed that large firms would
face intemational  competition, and that, presumably,  international  competition meant that it was
not necessary to foster domestic competition.  To the extent that advisers worried about this
issue, the question then became sequencing of trade liberalization,  again ignoring the question of
building the institutional  framework for functioning competitive  domestic  markets.
These decisions had serious consequences  as privatization in many countries failed to
foster competitive markets,  instead creating  large private monopolies.  This approach to
privatization  was also common across  sectors and countries.  Many countries privatized their
telecommunications  firns, for example,  without paying close attention to building a regulatory
authority.  Countries  often privatized first and then turned their attention to building regulatory
capacity later.  In this paper I use the worldwide  experience in telecommunications  reforms to
explore this issue.
Telecommunications
l This fear is still a real one.  A proposal  in Russia would establish  a single agency to coordinate tariffs in energy,
railways,  transport terminals, atomic  energy, water and air transport, gas and communications-a  proposal that
sounds remarkably like centralized planning and optimization Larina, Ekaterina.  2001. "Ministries Scrap Over
Single Tariff Authority: Govemment Seeks Better Regulation of Natural  Monopolies."  The Russia Journal, Vol. 4
No. 31 ed..
4The debate on reform sequencing has, to my knowledge, been completely devoid of any
econometric  or empirical work.  This gap is largely the result of a lack of data.  A very large
amount of data, however,  exists for telecommunications-a  prime sector for reforms and
privatization.  Telecommunications  has undergone dramatic shifts around the world since the
mid-1980s.  In  1980 nearly every country in the world save those in North America had a state
owned monopoly telecommunications  provider and no separate regulatory authority  outside of
the ministry tasked with overseeing and running the sector.  By 1999 90 countries around the
world had at least partially privatized their telecommunications  firms, and 95 had built separate
regulatory authorities (International  Telecommunications  Union  1999).
Substantial evidence reveals that privatization can lead to performance  improvements.
Megginson, et al.  (1994) compare pre- and post-privatization financial and operating
performance of 61  companies (in 32 industries,  including telecommunications)  from 18
countries.  They find increased  sales, profits, investments,  and employment following
privatization.  Early case studies and empirical work compared average performance indicators
across firms  or countries before and after reforns took effect.  Not surprisingly,  given the
region's relatively early start in reforms, most of that evidence was from Latin America.  In
general,  these studies found positive effects of reforms (e.g.,  Kikeri, et al.  1992;Wellenius  1992).
Though privatization  has yielded significant benefits,  allowing entry and competition into
the sector appears to bring far greater benefits.  A monopoly provider, whether state-owned or
private,  faces fewer incentives  to improve service and lower prices than do firms operating  in a
competitive  environment.  As Ambrose, et al (1990)  note,  "simply moving a monopoly from the
public to the private sphere will not result in competitive behavior."  More recent empirical work
has been able to work with panel data as enough time has elapsed to make econometric  analysis
more useful.  Across the board this research finds that competition drives the biggest
improvements  in the sector (Li and Xu 2001;McNary  2001;Petrazzini  1996b;Ros  1999;Wallsten
2001a).
The most elusive research so far, though, has been on the effects of regulatory reform.
The research that exists suggests that regulatory issues were typically given short shrift
compared to privatization.  Wellenius, et al (1992), among the first to address regulatory reforms
pointed out in their case studies that while many countries privatized their telecom firms quickly,
they built up regulatory capacity much more slowly.  Galal and Nauriyal (1995)  compared the
5performance of the telecom sector in several countries before and after regulatory reforms.  They
attempt to explore how well countries  were able to balance regulatory objectives:  commitment,
information asymmetry,  and pricing issues.  They found that the country in their sample (Chile)
that resolved all three issues achieved the greatest improvement,  while the country (the
Philippines) that did not experienced  the worst performance.  Countries that resolved some issues
experienced mixed success.  Finally, in a recent empirical paper using a sample of 30 African
and Latin American countries I found that privatization alone was uncorrelated with
improvements  in the sector, while privatization  combined with building regulatory capacity was
(Wallsten 2001 a).
The existing research suggests that regulatory reforms are important, though our
empirical knowledge on the issue is quite limited.  One question about which we know very little
is whether the order of reforms matters.  Two main hypotheses  suggest that sequencing  could
matter, both of which are empirically testable.  The first hypothesis  is that having in place a
regulatory authority prior to privatization will facilitate improvements  in the sector following
privatization.  An incumbent telecom monopolist faces both the incentive and the means to
prevent competition.  Telecommunications,  once thought to be a natural monopoly, clearly no
longer is (Crandall and Waverman  1995;Noll  1987;2000).  Wireless technology, in particular,
has made competition feasible.  And, as discussed above, a growing body of literature has
demonstrated that where competition has developed (almost always  from new wireless entrants),
it brings about dramatic  improvements  in countries' telecommunications  networks sector (Li and
Xu 2001;Petrazzini  1996a;Ros  1999;Wallsten  2001a).  While competition is technically possible,
new entrants must surmount large obstacles to gain a foothold.  In particular,  network
externalities in telecommunications  mean that the network is more valuable the more people are
connected to it.  New entrants, therefore,  are more likely to succeed when they can interconnect
with the incumbent  telecommunications  firm in order to reach its customers.
The incumbent telecommunications  firm has no incentive to allow such interconnection
and every incentive to prevent competition in order to maintain its monopoly profits.  This desire
will only increase with a privatized incumbent.  Putting the regulatory framework in place before
privatizing the firm may help foster competition or ensure that the incumbent monopolist's
investment obligations  are clear when the firm is privatized.  This hypothesis would suggest that
6building regulatory capacity prior to privatization  should yield greater improvements  and
investment  in the telecommunications  network.
The second hypothesis is that failing to put in place the regulatory framework prior to
privatization will reduce the value of the firm to investors (Stiglitz 1999).  Investors bidding on
the firm being privatized will require a risk premium to compensate them for future changes in
the regulatory rules of the game.  If the regulatory  structure is in place at the time of privatization
investors face less uncertainty and, therefore, are willing, on average, to pay more for the firm.
Though there have been no empirical tests of these hypotheses, a detailed case study of
the telecommunications  privatization in Argentina seemed to bear them out (Hill and Abdala
1996).  The authors found that while privatization proceeded rapidly in 1990, little attention was
paid to the regulatory framework.  Though a regulatory framework was drawn up the same year,
little was done at first to implement it.  Many of the rules were rewritten and the management
changed within a year.  This uncertainty  seemed to hurt the privatization process, causing
investors to demand very large risk premiums.
Building on the debate, theory, and case studies, this paper will test empirically whether
sequencing of regulatory reform  and privatization  affects both sector performance  and the price
investors are willing to pay for the privatized firm.  The sections below detail the data I use,
empirical methods, and results.
Data
I use data from two primary sources  to test the effects of sequencing.  First, the
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) compiles telecommunications  data for every
country around the world.  I use sector data on the number of telephone mainlines, telecom
investment,  and cellular subscribers.  The ITU also conducts regulatory surveys every year, and
the  1999 survey lists which countries have a separate regulatory authority and the year it was
established.  Finally, data on whether and when the country's incumbent telecom firm was
privatized also comes from another ITU survey.  This combination of data allows me to
determine whether the firm was privatized,  whether there is a regulatory authority, and which
came first.  I complement  these data with information on population and GDP, which are crucial
controls since the most important determinant of telecommunications  development is per capita
7income (Roller and Waverman 2001).  I thus have complete data for 197 countries from 1985
through  1999, yielding a panel dataset with 2,533 observations.  Though it is not practical to list
all the countries in a table, Table 1 provides the year a regulator was established and telecom
firm privatized where for each country where at least one of those events happened.
Second, the World Bank-Stanford  University Infrastructure Privatization Database allows
me to test the effects of sequencing decisions  on the price investors pay for the firm.  This
database  is an ongoing effort to collect systematic, comparable  data across  countries and time on
firms and countries undertaking telecommunications  reforms.  From this database I can extract
data on firms in 33 countries, including the price paid, share purchased,  and other factors that can
influence investors' valuation of the firms, such as whether the firm received  an exclusivity
period (that is, a guaranteed monopoly for a period of time).  I supplement this information with
data from the ITU and from the U.S. Federal Communications  Commission (FCC).  Table 2 lists
summary information on the firms included in the data.  Some countries privatized more than
one firm, reflecting a decision to break the incumbent up geographically  (as in Argentina and
Brazil) or function (domestic and international  firms in El Salvador and Brazil).  I explain the
variables  in more detail when describing the empirical method below.
Empirical Method and Results
As discussed, this paper tests two hypotheses regarding sequencing of reforms:  that
building a separate regulator before privatization  will (1)  aid sector development, and (2)
increase  the price investors are willing to pay for the privatized firm.  I explore each hypothesis
separately below.
Regulatory reforms and sector investment and  performance
As mentioned above, the first task is to test whether the sequence of reforms affect sector
performance.  I estimate several versions of equation (1) to explore this question.
(I)  In(sector  performance) = ,Bo + 81 (regulator  prior  to privatization) +/32(private) +
/3(regulator)+ 13(regulator*private)  +/34(independent)+
185(independent*private) +  36  *In(population)+ 37*ln(gdp per  capita)
+at  +  Ye  + e
8Finding a good measure of sector performance is not easy, and no country-level  indicator can
hope to perfectly capture the state of the industry.  Still, the ITU provides country-level
indicators that provide  a decent snapshot of the state of the sector.  In particular, I estimate each
version of the equation four times with using four dependent variables to proxy for sector
performance  and investment.  I first use the number of  telephone mainlines in the country-year,
consistent with most empirical work in the area.  And although I control for population, I next
estimate  the equation using the number of mainlines per capita.  Third, I use telecom investment,
and finally, the number of  mobile cellular subscribers. Each of these indicators  is problematic.
First, while the number of mainlines  is the most widely reported indicator around the world,
mainline service is becoming increasingly  less representative of the sector.  In particular,
competition  typically comes from entrants into wireless telephony, meaning that telephone
penetration  can increase  through cellular phone and not be reflected  in the number of mainlines.
Because the number of mainlines  is increasingly less representative of telephone density,
I also use reported telecom investment.  The problem with this indicator, however, is that it
typically only reflects investments by the incumbent firms.  Still, if reforms affect the
incumbent's  investment and if the incumbent's investment  is important to the sector,  then this
variable is a reasonable indicator of the effect of reforms on the sector.  Finally, I also explore
what happens to the number of mobile cellular subscribers.  Again, this variable typically
excludes entrants,  who often hold the bulk of new mobile subscribers, meaning that the variable
is incomplete.  Nonetheless, if the incumbent's investment is affected by reforms,  it may invest
in mobile services instead of landlines.  It is thus important to explore  the various ways the
incumbent might invest after privatization.
The remaining variables are defined as follows:
*  Regulator before privatization  is a dummy variable that equals one if the country
established a separate regulatory authority before privatizing the incumbent telecom firm.
The variable equals zero for countries with no regulator and for countries with a regulator
that was established the year of privatization or later.  It equals one beginning the year the
regulator was established.
9*  Private is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is private.  Note that this variable
does not capture degrees of privatization-even  a partly-private  firm is considered
privately owned.
*  Regulator  is a dummy variable that equals one if there exists a separate regulatory
authority in the country-year.
*  Regulator*Private  is an interaction variable that indicates whether there is a separate
regulator AND a private telecom firm.
*  Independent  is a dummy variable that equals one if the regulator claims to be independent
from political power.  Advisers typically recommend that a regulator must not be
influenced by short-term political pressures if it is to be effective.  Because this is such a
common claim, the ITU regulatory  survey asks regulators whether "the Regulatory
Authority [is] independent  form political power."  It is not entirely clear what answers to
this question might mean.  First, it is self-reported;  that is, the regulators themselves
answer the question.  Whether a regulator is, in fact, insulated from short-term political
pressures may differ from whether the regulator, when asked, says he is insulated.
Second,  almost no government agency is completely insulated  from political power.  The
variable,  therefore, best indicates whether the regulator wants the ITU to believe that it is
independent from political power.  Despite the numerous problems with this variable, it is
worth including in the estimation  since conventional reform advice  so strongly
emphasizes the importance of regulatory independence and, problematic  though it may
be, is the best systematic  information we have at the moment.
*  Independent*Private  is an interaction term that indicates whether the incumbent is
private AND there is a regulator that claims to be independent from political power.
Finally,  in addition to those variables,  the regression controls for population, per capita GDP, and
year and country-fixed  effects.
The strategy is to estimate the equation three times for each dependent variable,  including
additional exogenous  variables each time to test the robustness of the variable of interest
(regulator  before privatization). This approach yields twelve regressions, allowing us to see
whether there is any robustness or pattern across the results, which are presented in Table 3.
I find privatization by itself negatively and significantly correlated with the number of
mainlines, negatively  but not significantly correlated with mainlines per capita, but positively
10and significantly correlated with investment and the number of cellular subscribers.  A separate
regulator is negatively, though rarely significantly,  correlated with the number of mainlines,
mainlines per capita,  and investment.  It is positively and significantly  correlated with the
number of cellular subscribers, however.  Consistent with earlier work, the regressions reveal
that privatization combined with a separate regulator is positively correlated with the number of
mainlines and mainlines per capita, though not significantly correlated with this measure of
investment or cellular subscribers.
The coefficient on the independent variable is, surprisingly, negatively and significantly
correlated with the number of mainlines  and mainlines per capita.  It is not significantly
correlated with investment,  though the sign of the coefficient  is positive.  And with one
exception it is also not significantly correlated with the number of cellular subscribers,  though
the sign is negative.  The exception occurs when including both independent regulator  and
independent  *private  in the equation.  In that case, the coefficient on independent  is (weakly)
significantly positively correlated with the number of cellular subscribers, and negatively and
significantly correlated with interaction term.
The question at hand, though, is the effect of sequencing,  so we are most interested in the
effects of a separate regulator being established prior to privatizing the  firm.  Unlike the
coefficients  on other variables, which differ somewhat  by specification,  the results in this case
are remarkably robust.  Establishing a regulator prior to privatizing is significantly and positively
correlated with the number of mainlines,  mainlines per capita, investment,  and mobile
subscribers.  The one exception is that the coefficient is not significant when the dependent
variable is the number of mainlines  and the variables measuring independence  are also included.
Though it is dangerous to leap from correlation to causality,  overall the results strongly support
hypothesis  one: establishing a regulatory authority before privatizing the firm enhances
investment and sector performance.
Regulatory reforms and the privatizedfirm  's value to investors
The second hypothesis to test regarding sequencing  is the effect of the order of reforms
on the price investors  are willing to pay for the privatized  firm.  The hypothesis is that investors
will require  a risk premium in countries privatizing without having first established  regulatoryinstitutions  to compensate  for the uncertain nature of the rules of the game in the industry.  I test
this hypothesis by estimating equation (2) below using data from the World Bank Stanford
University Infrastructure  Reform database discussed above.2 The data I compile to estimate the
regression is a combination  of firm and country-level data, where data on the privatization of the
firm is combined with the firm's respective country-level  data.
(2) In(impliedfirm value) = fo + /31 *(regulator  prior to privatization) + /32 *(exclusivity)  +
/33*ln(number mainlines) +/34*1n(population)  + /5*1n(gdp per
capita) + /36 *ln(international  settlement payments) + e
I derive the dependent variable, impliedfirm value, from the price paid by the winning bidder
and the share of the firm the bidder bought.  Regulator  prior  to privatization is, as above,
whether there was a regulatory authority in place prior to privatization.  Exclusivity is a dummy
variable indicating whether the firm was given any period of guaranteed monopoly status after
privatization.  The number of mainlines is as defined above,  and here proxies  for the assets
purchased by the investor.  Population and per capita  gdp control for the potential market-size
and wealth of the country.
International  settlement payments are the net payments the country's  telephone company
receives from United States-based carriers  for international  call from the U.S. that terminate in
that country.  These payments result from bilaterally negotiated  "accounting rates" between each
country-pair in the world for international  message telephone service.  Only the U.S., the U.K.,
and New Zealand make the rates and net payments public.  The FCC posts on its website current
accounting rates, net payments to each country, and historical  data.  These payments  may be an
important component of an investor's willingness  to pay since the payments can be quite large.
Between  1985  and  1998 developing countries received nearly $35 billion in net settlement
payments from U.S. carriers (Wallsten  2001b).  Mexico alone,  for example,  received more than
$550 million in 1990, the year it was privatized-an  amount large enough to be one of the
factors potentially explaining investors'  willingness  to pay nearly  $1.8 billion for 20.4 percent of
the company.
Table 4 presents the results of this regression.  Having a guaranteed  monopoly is valuable
to investors, substantially increasing  the selling price of the firm.  Population, per capita income,
2 It is important to note that this regression  includes data ONLY on firms that were privatized,  meaning that the
regression tells us nothing about the effects of  privatization,  per se.
12number of mainlines, and international  settlement payments are also positively and significantly
correlated with the implied firm value,  as expected.  The coefficient on the variable of interest,
regulator prior to privatization,  is also positive and significant, consistent with the hypothesis.  In
other words, investors appear to be willing to pay more for a firm privatized in an environment
with less institutional uncertainty.
Though the results are statistically significant and large in magnitude, the results should
be interpreted with care.  The sample is small and nonrandom, meaning that it may not be
possible to extrapolate out of sample.  Nonetheless,  the results strongly support the notion that
investors will demand a risk premium to invest in an uncertain institutional environment.
In the section below I discuss all of these results in more detail, considering what they
mean overall and other interpretations that might be consistent with the results.
Discussion
Though it is not the focus of the paper, the generally negative coefficient on the variable
indicating that the regulator claims to be independent of political power is surprising given the
emphasis advisers place on the importance of such independence.  This result must be considered
carefully, as the variable itself is highly problematic.  First, the variable is simply whether  the
regulator himself claims to be independent.  The self-reported nature of the variable makes the
validity of the answer questionable.  Second,  almost no government agency is truly independent,
so it is difficult to know what to make of a regulator claiming  to be independent.  Finally, there is
a difference between being independent from short-term political pressures and completely
independent from political pressure, and the variable provides no distinction between  those two
types of independence.  The robust nature of this negative result across specifications, however,
suggests that the correlation may be more than a spurious  one.  At least two hypotheses  are
consistent with the result, though of course there is no way to rule out a spurious correlation
here.
First, it is possible that too much independence from political influence  is harmful.  For
example, if consumers'  preferences  are at all expressed through the political  system (and
certainly in many countries  they are not), then divorcing politics from regulation could, in
principle,  make it easier for the already-organized  privatized firm to capture the regulator.  That
13is, under this scenario the regulated private firm has close contact with the regulator, carefully
controlling the flow of information.  Consumers, meanwhile,  have much less access since their
interests would come to the regulator through the political system.  In this case the firm could
easily capture the regulator, with little recourse by the government.
Second, it is possible that the variable has little to do with actual political  independence.
Instead, it could be much more closely related to the regulators' belief of what they think the
surveyor (or those reading the results) want to hear.  In particular, the World Bank and other
international  organizations emphasize the importance of independent regulatory authorities.
Some regulators,  therefore, may feel that they should answer "yes" to the question of whether
they are independent,  regardless of whether,  in fact, they are.  Those same countries who claim
to have "independent" regulators because  that's what they believe  is expected of them may be
the same countries who reform state-owned enterprises only because reform is required to
receive international  aid.  Those countries are unlikely to be committed to true reforms, leading
to the trappings of reforms on paper, but not to improvements on the ground.
The results on the sequencing  issue are also robust and are consistent with the hypotheses
being tested.  Having a regulator in place prior to privatizing the telecom firm is correlated with
improvements in telephone penetration and investment  by the incumbent,  and with an increased
investor valuation of the firm when it is privatized.  Unfortunately,  it is not immediately clear
that these results easily translate into policy recommendations.  In particular, there may be
endogeneity issues to consider.
It is possible, for example, that countries  that privatized quickly had especially poorly-
performing  telecom firms that they wanted to be rid of.  Countries whose firms were not in such
bad shape may have felt they could take more time in the reform process, carefully building
regulatory agencies that could help oversee the privatization  process.  In this case, firms that
perform worse would be sold more quickly than firms that perform better, making it more likely
that bad firms would be sold before the complicated task of building a regulator was complete.  It
is also possible that countries  with more solid political institutions, in general, were more easily
able to build credible  regulatory agencies in addition to having other institutions that made
reforms more likely to succeed.  As Levy and Spiller (1996)  note, the "credibility and
effectiveness of a regulatory  framework, and so its ability to encourage private investment and
support efficiency in the production and use of services, vary with a country's  political and social
14institutions."  The analysis in this paper deals with some of these issues by including country and
year fixed effects.  Country fixed effects control for a country-specific  issues such as the
propensity to reform and institutional  quality, while year fixed-effects  control for general trends
of changes in telecom service.  Nonetheless,  while the results are consistent with theoretical
predictions, it is important to be aware of these issues when considering these results.
Conclusion
The debate over the best sequence  of stages in a reform process is a long one.  Early in
the process many advisers,  especially those involved in privatizations in Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union advocated fast privatization,  with the belief that market institutions would
be built once private ownership was established.  More recent thinking recognizes  the
importance of institutions and the importance of setting the rules of the game if markets are
going to function.  These issues may be especially important  in infrastructure utilities, where the
incumbent can be a significant bottleneck to competition.  In telecommunications,  for example, it
is especially difficult for an entrant to succeed if the incumbent does not allow interconnection.
Without a regulator,  or some unbiased entity overseeing the incumbent's  behavior, the privatized
firm has no incentive to allow competition,  which we know to be the most effective agent of
change.
To date there has been no empirical work on whether the sequence of reforms matters.
This paper is an attempt to fill that gap using data on the telecommunications  sector.  I find that
establishing a regulatory authority before privatizing the telecom firm is correlated with
increased telephone penetration, telecom investment,  and mobile cellular subscriptions.  This
result is consistent with the hypothesis that it is important to first build the institutional and
regulatory framework  and then privatize,  as opposed to simply creating a private monopoly.  I
also find that establishing  a regulator prior to privatizing the firm substantially  increases the price
investors are willing to pay for the firm,  consistent with the hypothesis that investors require a
risk premium to invest in a market with uncertain rules.
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1  7Table I
Countries that Privatized and/or Established  a Separate Regulator
year  year  year  year
Countryprivatyear  regulator  Country  yrvaiear  regulator
established  established
Albania  n/a  1998  Kenya  nla  1999
Angola  n/a  1999  Kiribati  1983  nt/a
Argentina  1990  1990  Kyrgyzstan  n/a  1997
Armenia  1998  nta  Latvia  1994  1992
Australia  1997  1992  Lithuania  1998  n/a
Austria  1998  1997  Luxembourg  n/a  1997
Bahrain  1981  1996  Madagascar  1995  1997
Barbados  always  n/a  Malawi  n/a  1998
Belgium  1996  1993  Malaysia  1990  1998
Belize  1996  1988  Maldives  1988  n/a
Bhutan  nta  1998  Mali  n/a  2000
Bolivia  1995  1995  Malta  1998  1997
Botswana  nta  1996  Mauritania  nta  1999
Brazil  1998  1997  Mauritius  n/a  1988
Bulgaria  nta  1998  Mexico  1990  1996
Burkina Faso  n/a  1999  Mongolia  1995  1995
Burundi  n/a  1997  Morocco  n/a  1998
Cameroon  nta  1998  Mozambique  n/a  1992
Canada  always  1976  Namibia  n/a  1992
Cape Verde  1995  1992  Nepal  n/a  1998
Central African Republi  1990  1996  Netherlands  1994  1997
Chile  1988  nta  New Zealand  1990  nla
Colombia  n/a  1994  Nicaragua  n/a  1995
Costa Rica  nta  1996  Nigeria  n/a  1992
Croatia  1999  2000  Norway  n/a  1987
Cuba  1994  nta  Pakistan  1996  1996
Czech Republic  1994  1993  Panama  1997  1996
Denmark  1991  1991  Papua New Guinea  n/a  1997
Ecuador  nta  1995  Paraguay  n/a  1995
Egypt  n/a  1998  Peru  1994  1993
El Salvador  1997  1996  Philippines  always  1979
Equatorial Guinea  1987  n/a  Poland  1998  nla
Eritrea  nta  1998  Portugal  1995  1989
Estonia  1993  1998  Qatar  1998  n/a
Ethiopia  n/a  1996  Romania  1998  n/a
Finland  1998  1988  Russia  1997  n/a
France  1997  1997  Senegal  1997  n/a
Gabon  n/a  2000  Serbia  1997  n/a
Georgia  1994  n/a  Seychelles  1954  n/a
Germany  1996  1998  Singapore  1993  1992
Ghana  1997  1997  Slovakia  2000  1993
Greece  1996  1995  Slovenia  1996  n/a
Grenada  1989  n/a  Solomon Islands  1990  n/a
Guatemala  1998  1996  South Africa  1997  1997
Guinea  1996  1995  South Korea  1993  n/a
Guinea-Bissau  1990  n/a  Spain  1992  n/a
Guyana  1991  1992  Sri Lanka  1997  1991
Haiti  n/a  1969  Sudan  1994  1996
Honduras  n/a  1995  Sweden  2000  1992
Hungary  1993  1990  Switzerland  1998  1992
Iceland  n/a  1997  Tanzania  n/a  1994
India  n/a  1997  Togo  n/a  1999
Indonesia  1995  n/a  Trinidad and Tobago  1989  n/a
Ireland  1996  1997  Turkey  nta  2000
Israel  1990  n/a  Uganda  2000  1997
Italy  1998  1998  United Arab Emirates  1976  n/a
Ivory Coast  1997  1995  United Kingdom  1984  1984
Jamaica  1989  1995  United States  always  1934
Japan  1985  n/a  Vanuatu  1990  n/a
Jordan  2000  1995  Venezuela  1991  1991
Kazakhstan  1994  n/a  Zambia  n/a  1994
"n/a" - firm not privatized or regulator not established
Source:  ITU-BDT Telecommunications  Regulatory Database,  1999
18Table 2
Privatization Summary Statistics
Country  Firm name  ~~~~~~~~~~~~transaction  price paid  shr  od  nuni  implied  imfevau Country  Firm name  year  (S  millions)  mainlines  value (5  m per line
millions)  prln
Argentina  TASA (south)  1990  2834  60  1,695,504  4,723  2,786
Argentina  Telecom Argentina (north)  1990  2408  60  1,401,969  4,013  2,863
Barbados  Cable &  Wireless BARTEL  1991  3  11  77,977  27  350
Bolivia  ENTEL  1995  610  50  246,881  1,220  4,942
Brazil  Embratel  1998  2370  19.26  17,932,814  12,305  686
Brazil  Telesp  1998  5160  19.26  6,377,677  26,791  4,201
Brazil  Telecentro-Sul  1998  1850  19.26  3,757,261  9,605  2,556
Brazil  Telenorte-Leste  1998  3070  19.26  7,797,876  15,940  2,044
Chile  CTC  1988  99.5  30  591,565  332  561
Cote d'lvoire  Cote d'lvoire Telecom  1997  210  51  143,800  412  2,863
Czech Republic  SPT Telecom  1995  1450  27  2,444,156  5,370  2,197
El Salvador  Compania de Telecomunicaciones  (CTE)  1998  275  51  396,402  539  1,360
El Salvador  Intemacional  de Telecomunicaciones  (INTEL)  1998  41  51  396,402  80  203
Ghana  Ghana Telecom  1996  38  30  77,886  127  1,626
Guatemala  Telecomunicaciones de Guatemala (TELGUA)  1998  700  95  517,000  737  1,425
Guinea  SOTELGUI  1995  45  60  10,900  75  6,881
Guyana  Guyana Telephone and Telegraph Ltd.  (GT&T)  1991  16.5  80  16,000  21  1,289
Hungary  MATAV (Magyar Tavkozlesi Vallalat)  1993  875  30.29  1,466,946  2,889  1,969
Jamaica  Jamaica Telephone Company (JTC)  1987  155.8  79  81,700  197  2,414
Mexico  TelMex  1990  1757.6  20.4  5,354,500  8,616  1,609
Mongolia  Mongolia Telecoms  1995  4.5  40  77,745  11  145
Peru  Telefonica del Peru  1994  2002  35  772,390  5,720  7,406
Poland  Telekomunikacja Polska S.A. (TP)  2000  4300  35  . 12,286
South Africa  Telkom, SA  1997  1260  30  4,650,000  4,200  903
Tanzania  Tanzania Telecommunications  Company Limited (TTC  2000  120  35  163,000  343  2,103
Trinidad  &  Tobago  Trinidad &  Tobago Telephone Company  1989  85  49  165,000  173  1,051
Uganda  Uganda Telecom Ltd. (UTL)  2000  33.5  51  57,239  66  1,148
Venezuela  CANTV  1991  1885  51  1,598,947  3,696  2,312
Senegal  SONATEL  1997  106.6  33  95,100  323  3,397
Jordan  Jordan Telecommunication  Corporation  2000  508  40  565,000  1,270  2,248
Panama  INTEL / Cable & Wireless Panama  1997  652  49  366,000  1,331  3,636
Romania  RomTelecom  1998  675  35  3,600,000  1,929  536
Source: World Bank Stanford Infastructure  Privatization  Database and ITU
19Table 3
Telecommunications Reforms and Investment
Dependent Variable  ln(number mainlines)  ln(mainlines per capita)  ln(telecom investment)  ln(cellular subscribers)
Regulator before  privatization?  0.101  0.120  0.097  0.106  0.122  0.102  0.319  0.343  0.344  0.739  0.815  0.612
(2.32)^  (2.70)-  (2.16)-  (2.86)--  (3.22)*-  (2.68)--  (1.97)^  (2.12)-  (2.10)-  (1-67)+  (1,79)+  (1.33)
Private?  -0.050  -0.052  -0.047  -0.009  -0.012  -0.008  0.222  0.204  0.204  0.658  0.642  0.686
(2.01)-  (2.05)^  (1.86)+  (0.40)  (0.55)  (0.35)  (2.20)-  (2.04)-  (2.03)-  (2.52)-  (2.43)-  (2.59)--
Regulator?  -0.108  -0.048  -0.083  -0.100  -0.067  -0.097  -0.281  -0.467  -0.466  0.831  0.602  0.310
(2.35)'  (0.90)  (1.55)  (2.56)-  (1.49)  (2.13)-  (1.66)+  (2.42)-  (2.36)-  (1.77)+  (1.11)  (0.56)
Regulator-Private  0.081  0.065  0.165  0.111  0.095  0.181  -0.034  0.040  0.038  0.385  -0.236  0.596
(1.95)+  (1.54)  (3.27)--  (3.12)--  (2.63)--  (4.20)--  (0.22)  (0.26)  (0.20)  (0.90)  (0.54)  (1.15)
Regulator independent of political power?  -0.138  -0.039  -0.072  0.013  0.138  0.137  -0.020  0.810
(4.13)--  (0.90)  (2.53)-  (0.34)  (1.08)  (0.83)  (0.06)  (1.82)+
Independent *  Private  -0.207  -0.177  0.003  -1.728
(3.62)-  (3.63)--  (0.02)  (2.94)--
ln(population)  0.517  0.515  0.519  -0.445  -0.432  -0.428  1.110  0.740  0.740  -0.079  -0.134  -0.108
(7.79)--  (7.69)--  (7.76)-'  (7.89)''  (7.56)'-  (7.52)-'  (2.73)*'  (1.81)+  (1.81)+  (0.12)  (0.19)  (0.16)
ln(gdp per capita)  0.030  0.029  0.030  0.051  0.049  0.049  0.506  0.505  0.505  0.637  0.618  0.618
(2.59)--  (2.55)-  (2.57)-  (5.22)--  (4.99)--  (5.02)--  (10.1 1)--  (10.13)--  (10.12)--  (5.44)--  (5.22)--  (5.23)--
Constant  9.277  8.330  8.269  8.106  7.959  7.907  -3.730  2.074  2.075  -2.233  7.712  7.294
(8.83)--  (8.00)--  (7.96)--  (9.24)--  (8.99)--  (8.95)--  (0.58)  (0.32)  (0.32)  (0.21)  (0.71)  (0.67)
Observations  2533  2419  2419  2543  2428  2428  1915  1842  1842  2486  2371  2371
Numberof Countries  197  189  189  197  189  189  184  176  176  196  1e8  188
R-souared  0.72  0.72  0.72  0.53  0.54  0.54  0.28  0.27  0.27  0.66  0.66  0.66
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
Country and year fixed effects included
+  significant at  10%; *  significant at 5%; * significant at 1  %
20Table 4
Regulator Prior to Privatization & Price Paid
dependent variable  ln(implied value)
Regulator in place prior to privatization?  0.698
(2.50)*




ln(gdp per capita)  0.621
(2.85)**
ln(number mainlines)  0.346
(2.06)*






Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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